

THE
CASE
OF THE
HANOVER FORCES,
In the PAY of
GREAT-BRITAIN,
Impartially and freely examined.
WITH SOME
Seasonable Reflexions
ON THE
Present Conjunction of Affairs.



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Case of the *Hanover* Forces, &c.

WHOEVER hath attended to the last Twenty Years Opposition to the late Minister, must necessarily conclude, from the Writings, Speeches, and other Declarations of those who had then the Honour to be at the Head of it, that it was founded on two known and avowed Facts, *viz.* notorious Corruption and Waste of the publick Treasure at Home, for the Support of the said Minister's own Power and Projects; and the open and manifest Sacrifice of the *British* Interest and Glory Abroad, to those foreign Dominions, in which it was even a Condition, in the *Act* of Settlement, that we should have no Concern: Insomuch, that the Necessity of the first was contended for, and the Use of it justified both within Doors and without; and, as to the last, it was, even by our Ministers themselves, acknowledged to be the Touchstone of all our Negotiations at every Court in *Europe*.

Now, as the Effect of Pensions, Places, &c. continues to be as visible, nay, is become more glaring than ever, there is no Need to throw any additional Light on what is sufficiently distinguished by its own: But as our foreign Affairs are more intricate in their own Nature, and are besides glossed over with specious Pretences, which are at once both artificial and delusive, it becomes most critically necessary, especially with regard to the taking no less than 16000 *Hanoverians* into *British* Pay, to introduce what we have more immediately to lay before the Publick, with a short Review of our foreign Transactions, from the happy Accession of the present Royal Family.

Be it remembred, therefore, that his late Majesty had no sooner taken Possession of the Throne, than he entertained Thoughts of Aggrandizing his Electoral Dominions, though a Rebellion than raged in the Heart of the Kingdom, tho' almost Half his Subjects were disaffected, and the Pretender actually landed in *Scotland*, with an Intent to struggle with him in Person for the Crown.

In Pursuance of this favorite Project, *Bremen* and *Verden* were almost instantly purchased of *Denmark*, and *Great-Britain* found herself at once engaged to guaranty the Possession of *Sleswick* to that Crown, and saddled with a Vote of Credit for 250,000*l.* to put us in Security against the Resentments of the King of *Sweden*, who, of an old Ally, became a most exasperated Enemy, as, had his Life been prolonged, we might have had more fatal Experience.

As it was, a Rupture between the two Kingdoms immediately followed; the King, as Elector of *Hanover*, having first declared War in virtue of his late Alliance with *Denmark*, and a *British* Fleet being next dispatched up the *Baltick*, to compel *Sweden* to connive at the Wrong which had been done her, or accept of a large Sum of *Sterling* Money by way of Recompence.

In this Distress the *Swedes* thought the last the most eligible Expedient, and, for the present, put up a Quarrel they were not in a proper Condition to prosecute to Advantage.

But the Drudgery imposed on the *British* Fleet did not end here: *Russia* had given Offence to the Court of *Hanover*, by interfering in the Affair of *Mecklenbourg*, which, on Account both of its Extent and Situation, would have made a noble Addition to his Majesty's Electoral Dominions; *Russia* therefore was to be humbled, and *Great-Britain* was tasked to accomplish what was out of the Power of *Hanover*.

But, during these Commotions in the North, it was found convenient to enter into a Treaty with the Emperor; a Treaty accordingly was agreed upon in 1716. by which his late Majesty and the Emperor engaged mutually to defend and preserve each other in the Possession of whatever Kingdoms, Provinces and Rights (in the Condition they now are) they then actually held and enjoyed, or which, during the Continuance of that League, they should, by mutual Consent, acquire; which was to be understood as a sufficient Guarantee for whatever *Hanover* had, or should acquire in the North.

The Advantages resulting from it to *Great-Britain* we shall see presently. A Misunderstanding between his Imperial Majesty and *Spain* takes Place, and the last forms a Design to make himself Master of *Sicily*: Upon which the Emperor calls upon us to fulfil our Engagements; this draws on the bold Stroke in the *Mediterranean* in 1718. under the Conduct of Sir *George Byng*. In Consequence whereof, as *Sweden* before, *Spain*, of a firm Friend, becomes an implacable Enemy, and takes all Advantages of manifesting its Resentments; the sad Effects of which we both feel and lament to this Day.

But

But tho' this cavalier Step, so infinitely detrimental to *Great-Britain*, had been taken in favour of the Emperor, his Imperial Majesty was now, for certain Reasons, which will speedily be explained, to be made sensible of our Importance in making Peace as well as War, in order that *Hanover* might, for the future, rely more securely upon his Friendship and Protection: Accordingly, as *Great-Britain* had already been made the Bubble of the War, she was now to be made the Bubble of the Peace: As *Spain* had been provoked, to likeways *Spain* was to be appeased: Thus, to bring back the Court of *Vienna* to a proper Sense of Things, and pacify the Heart-Burnings of that of *Madrid*, *Gibraltar* was to be surrendered on one Hand, and the eventual Succession of *Don Carlos* to *Tuscany*, *Parma* and *Placentia*, was to be provided for by the Quadruple-Alliance upon the other: Nor could this be done till even the late King himself, by a Letter under his Hand, had signified, that it would not be his Fault if *Gibraltar* was not restored.

It must here be remembred, that the Year before this was rendered memorable by the Multiplicity of Treaties and Partitions then agitating, or concluded in the North; during which it appeared, that the Emperor was not altogether so implicitly the humble Servant of the Court of *Hanover*, as had been expected from him, in virtue of the Treaty of 1716. and the Services done him by *Great-Britain* since: In particular, he was far from joining in the Project before mentioned, of humiliating *Russia*, as more clearly appears by the Words of a certain great Writer for the late Administration, who, when his Imperial Majesty was to be vilified, is pleased, however injudiciously, to express himself as follows. ‘Had the ancient Proverb of *German* Faith been infallible, a certain great Prince had granted an Investiture which he once solemnly promised, on a very valuable Consideration; nor would he have expected a Million Sterling for a refreshing Fee.

From the Moment therefore that the Emperor ceased to co-operate in the great Work of aggrandizing *Hanover*, it was both discovered, that the over-grown Power of the House of *Austria* became dangerous to the Liberties of *Europe*, and resolved to reduce it again within a proper Bound: But, as this was not to be affected only by the secret Treaty of *Madrid*, we, at the same Time, threw ourselves into the Arms of *France*, and acted by the Directions of her Ministers without Reserve; which will serve to account for the Part we took in the Quarrel between the *French* and *Spanish* Courts, the refusing the sole Mediation between *Spain* and the Emperor; and the involving ourselves in the *Hanover* Alliance: From all which

Circumstances we are taught, that the Interest of Great-Britain was never thought of all this Time, unless to be sacrificed.

Now, that the said Alliance was calculated only for the Preservation of *Lower Saxony*, or rather to support and defend the new Possessions and Claims of the Electorate of *Hanover*, is, beyond all Controversy, made appear by the Writings and Speeches of those in the Opposition to the late Minister; as likeways, that the present exorbitant Power of the House of *Austria* was no better than a political Bugbear, to be found nowhere, no, not in the Brain of those who endeavoured most to have it mistaken for a Reality; consequently that all the Millions squandered by us on that Occasion, and under that Pretence, served only to exhaust ourselves, and avenge the Cause of *Hanover* upon the House of *Austria*.

Indeed the very Basis of that pernicious Alliance was grounded on Absurdities and Impracticabilities, to say no worse: That we were not drawn by it into a War with the Emperor, is not to be imputed to those who advised it, and that a War with *Spain* was the Consequence of it, cannot be denied, at least a half War; a War on one Side, if not on the other: This half War again generated a half Peace; the which, if *Hanover* was not a Gainer by, the Emperor in the End became, very sufficiently, a Loser: The equitable Designs on *Mecklenbourg*, &c. were not yet relished at *Vienna*, though so mighty a Confederacy was formed to persuade him to it; and therefore his Imperial Majesty was still too great and formidable. To be Friends with *Spain* was then our Interest upon any Terms; we not only treat, but humour, concede, nay, solicit the Honour of being Convoys to *Don Carlos* into *Italy*; that very *Don Carlos*, who was so lately set forth, as likely to become the so long dreaded universal Monarch of *Europe*. Now, to what did all this contribute? Not to the Peace, Security, Wealth, or Honour of *England*: No; but to the Reduction of the still too potent House of *Austria*: For, though that House was already involved in almost insuperable Difficulties; though that of *Bourbon* flourished in exact Proportion as the other declined; nay, tho' we had incontestable Evidence that *Dunkirk* was even then repairing, yet our Ministers persisted notwithstanding, and the whole Strength of the British Empire was to be steered by the *Hanover* Rudder.

But all would not do: At the Moment of Projection all blew up; and, when their Hopes were at the highest, they found they had built upon the Sands.

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Though the People of *England* had stooped like a Camel to be loaded, and patiently suffered Placemen and Pensioners to hang upon them like so many Horse-Leches, they could not be induced to submit to new Taxes and Impositions, in order to destroy that Balance of Power, which, at such an incredible Expence of Blood and Treasure, they had endeavoured to render immovable, nor the House of *Austria* to be undone, that the petty Princes of *Germany* might aggrandize themselves out of their Spoils.

Finding, therefore, the Ground to sink beneath their Toil, our wise Ministers were forced to their old Track of Negotiations, even with the very Power they had so heartily endeavoured to ruin; accordingly we guaranty the *Pragmatick Sanction* Hand over Head, as the most popular Step which could then be taken in favour of the Balance of *Europe*, already almost ruined beyond Redemption: But, even in this Affair, *Hanover* acts upon a separate Bottom, provides for her own Satisfaction with all imaginable Secrecy and Address, and then accedes to a Treaty, which was irreconcileable with all her former Pursuits, and which actually clash'd with her apparent Interest, if that Interest consisted, as was more than suspected, in delivering *Germany* from that very Power it now stipulated to preserve.—But what has since been transacted by *Prussia* and *Saxony*, has furnished us with a Solution of this political Problem: Nor can it be supposed that the Forces and Treasures of *Great-Britain* were to be doled away without a valuable Consideration, as will be made more fully appear, when we come to examine the Mysteries of last Year, which we shall not fail to do in their proper Place.

It must here be observed, that this new Treaty, which thus dissolved the never-to-be forgotten *Hanover* Treaty, was entered into contrary to an express Article of the last, which obliged each of the contracting Parties not to enter into any new Engagements with any other Power, without a Communication first made to the rest of the Confederacy: This Peace *France* at once resented and despised; but, to take a pleasant Revenge, only changed a few Garrisons on their Frontiers, which threw our gallant Ministers into such a Panick, as if the Beacons were on Fire all round our Coasts, and the Pretender already on his March to *London*.

It appears, likeways, that this new Negotiation was as much a Secret at the *Hague* as *Versailles*; for when it was communicated to the States, they were at the same Time informed that *Hanover* was already satisfied: But tho' *Great-Britain* followed the Example, or perhaps obeyed the Prescription

scription of *Hanover*, *Holland* did not appear in Haste to do the same; and though the Accession of the States was at last obtained, it was not without Difficulties and Limitations; though we were obliged to swallow the Dose without gilding, or any Palliative whatever.

Thus we see the *Emperor*, *England* and *Holland*, once more in Articles with *Hanover* for the Head of the Confederacy: But whether the first was before-hand sufficiently bumbled, or whether the last sufficiently compensated, is not as yet to be decided. This however is most certain, that *Great-Britain* is still sick at Heart for having thrown her Weight into the wrong Scale, and being at the sole Expence of these ungrateful Experiments.

But whether this Reunion was placed on right Principles or wrong; whether it was a mercenary Bargain, or an honest Endeavour to preserve the publick Peace; one would have thought that the true Interest of the Maritime Powers would, once more, have been linked with that of the House of *Austria*, and all, in Conjunction, have been brought to act with their whole Power for the common Safety; especially since the very Terror, excited by a Change of *French* Garrisons only, had sufficiently convinced every Body where the real Danger lay.

I say, this is what one might have reasonably expected. But let us turn our Eyes to the Event.

Affairs were in this Situation when the King of *Poland* dies; and the Change, which succeeded thereupon, sufficiently proves how impossible it is to unite opposite Interests. While *Hanover* was most intent upon her favourite Project of humbling the House of *Austria*, she had cast her Eye on the declining Condition of King *Augustus*, and, apprehending a new Election must speedily come on, entered into Measures with *France*, for advancing *Stanislaus* once more to the Throne; it being a Point in which the Interests of the two Courts were in a Manner the same: A Prince in the Interest either of the House of *Austria*, or of *Russia*, giving equal Umbrage to both, as being both equally Enemies to the Power of the one, and the Influence of the other: If *Hanover*, in particular, had not met with the Returns she expected from *Vienna*, in the Affair of *Mecklenbourg*, &c. she had as little Reason to be satisfied with *Russia*, who was strongly inclined to recover *Sleswick* for the Duke of *Holstein*, on the Security of which, to the King of *Denmark*, depended the Continuance of *Bremen* and *Verden* to the Electorate of *Hanover*; *Russia* had, besides, busied herself in thwarting the Designs of that

that Court upon *Mecklenbourg*, which were not only obvious to, but gave a general Alarm to all the Powers of the North: As therefore *France* stood engaged, from all Considerations, to support King *Stanislaus*, *Hanover* made her Overtures, on that Head, with the more Frankness, and had the Pleasure of finding them received according to her own Wishes.

That the Court of *Versailles* was therefore so long before prepared for the Death of King *Augustus*, is intirely owing to the Politicks of *Hanover*; and that Instructions were immediately thereupon sent to the *English* Minister at *Warsaw*, to act accordingly, did not long continue a Secret to the Courts who were concerned in the Event: Even here, at home, Suspicions of that Kind arose soon after, and which it became necessary to clear up: To this End a Motion was made in Parliament for the Instructions given to the said Minister at that Time; but the Interest of the Premier, as usual, was too mighty for that of his Country, and a Negative defeated the Evidence, from Facts which must otherways have been produced, though a moral Certainty, that these Suspicions were true, arose even from the Negative itself: For, as these Instructions could, and did only relate to the Election, which was now over, there could be no other Reason for concealing them, but the Consciousness of their being more calculated for the Interest of *Hanover*, than those of *Great-Britain*.

Thus supported by *France* on one Hand, and *Hanover* on the other, *Stanislaus* was elected King of *Poland*, whereby the Influence of the first (though already so much dreaded) was like to receive a very considerable Accession in the North, and the last was gratified in her darling Point of mortifying and humbling the Court of *Vienna*; tho', for those very Reasons, it is apparent that scarce any Event upon the Continent could be more diametrically opposite to the Interest of these Kingdoms in particular, or the Balance of *Europe* in general.

The War, in which the Emperor was involved upon this Occasion, called loudly upon *England*, *Holland* and *Hanover*, for the Performance of the Guarantee they had so lately engaged in; and our eagle-eyed Ministers did not fail to make a proper Use of it; that is to say, they made it a Pretence to rise higher than ever in their Demands upon the People; and *Denmark*, as usual, lent her Name for Subsidies, which *Hanover* was not the worse for. Should it be asked, what Part that wise Electorate took upon this Occasion? Why, it looked on the Fray with its Hands in his Pockets; esteeming Treaties but Parchment, and ready Money too scarce a Commodity

mosity to be parted with in any Cause, or for any Engagement whatever.

In *Holland*, however, that the Farce, which was playing at home, might be carried on with some Decency and Consistency, our Resident there had Orders to be as loud and importunate as possible with the *States*, to enter with us into instant Measures for the Preservation of the House of *Austria*, and setting a Bound to the growing Power of *France*: And this our Ministers thought they might do very securely; since, the *States* being in the Secret of our inveterate Antipathy to the Emperor, it was not reasonable to suppose that they would launch into Expences, which they knew beforehand would, for that very Reason, be rendered vain and fruitless. But in this one Particular our true and trusty Friends refined too much. The *States*, with some Reason, believed, that when it appeared the House of *Austria* was in real Danger, even the darling Interest of the *Electorate* would be forced to recede a little to those of the Kingdom; and that even the People of *England* would have so much Influence as to carry one Point in favour of that Family, on which the general Balance of Power principally depended: Upon the repeated urgent and almost daily Applications of our said Resident, they at last, therefore, gave him to understand, that they were willing to meet his Offers half Way: When so! — it appeared — *he had no Power to treat.*

Thus, in consequence of this blessed *Polish* Election, *England* was more and more taxed and exhausted, and the Emperor remained unassisted notwithstanding, insomuch that he was compelled to throw himself into the very Bosom of his capital Enemy, upon any Terms he could get. And tho', by the Intervention of *Russia*, *Poland* was once more snatched from King *Stanislaus*, the House of *Bourbon* made a Shift to procure a noble Equivalent in the Duchy of *Lorrain*; not to mention the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, acquired by the joint Efforts of *France* and *Spain*, and bestowed upon Don *Carlos*.

But if the Balance of *Europe* was thus disjointed, that of *Germany* was now sufficiently provided for. There was no Room to set forth any longer, in such terrifying Colours, the overgrown Power of the House of *Austria*. — *Alas!* it was now in Ruins; and what his Most *Christian* Majesty had condescended to leave standing as a Monument of his Mercy, the Grand Signior threatened to destroy, the War in *Hungary* with the *Turks* taking Place, before the Wounds left by those in *Germany* and *Italy* were closed, and the Issue proving as fatal to the *Imperialists* as either of those which preceded it.

In this melancholly Interval the Emperor dies, leaving nothing but the Pragmatick Sanction for the Security of his Heirs; which proved of so little Signification, notwithstanding the great Names with which it was filled, that almost every one of the Electors, like most other Electors, thought it a proper Opportunity to make the most of his Vote, and all at the Expence of the helpless, abandoned House of *Austria*. A weak, pitiful, dependent Empcror, every one could find his Account in; whoever then they preferred, they resolved to strip first as bare as possible.

But, in the Midst of these royal Dreams of Dominion, *Havock*, Spoil and Plunder, the King of *Prussia* starts first into Action, pleads a Right, but takes Possession by Force, and avows a Resolution to hold it by the same Means; which unexpected Incident gave a new Aspect to the Face of *Germany*.

In the mean While, the Death of the Emperor, and the deplorable Situation of his Family, affected every *English* Heart as it ought; though, at the same Time, they were forced to acknowledge the superior Ability of that great Minister, who had so soon reduced that aspiring House, from being the Terror, to the Pity of the World. In Hope, however, that he would testify the same Ability in raising up, as pulling down, they very willingly agreed to all his Demands of Aids, Loans, and what not, flattering themselves that he would now, at least, apply them, as he ought, for the Service of *Great-Britain*, nor, — as before hath been sufficiently explained: Nor indeed were they wholly deceived: For the immediate Interest of *Hanover* had taken a new Turn from this bold Stroke of the King of *Prussia*'s. The Ties of Blood have but a feeble Hold on Princes. Thus, notwithstanding the Courts of *Berlin* and *Hanover* were so nearly related, Interest had set them at Variance; not only with regard to the Affair of *Mecklenbourg*, in which the undeniable Rights of the first were manifestly injured, but also on Account of certain Family-Claims at that Time unadjusted; as likeways, that there was a Sort of Rivalship between the Families, and any Access of Interest and Power to the one, was sure to give Umbrage to the other.

But to return— The Pretensions of *Prussia* were limited to certain Dutches and Lordships in *Silesia*; and, as the Event has proved, that he would have been satisfied with much less than he claimed, it cannot be enough wondered at, that Ways and Means had not been used to bring him to Terms, by Treaty and Negotiation (so much used upon more inconsiderable

siderable Occasions) before the Dispute was left to be decided by the Sword: But, instead of Experiments to soften him, which might gain so potent an Ally to assist in the Preservation of the House of *Austria*, and Increase of Power to the Protestant Interest; the Spirit of War alone prevailed against him, and the Court of *Vienna* was continually pressed to Action, and called upon for Plans of Operations against him; nay, so little was any Thought or Desire entertained of gaining him in a friendly Manner, and so little was apprehended from *France* at that Time, that certain Persons, for a While, enjoyed a Scheme for the Partition of his Dominions, and a Convention was actually formed for that Purpose; by which very Convention it appears, that the Queen of *Hungary* was the only contracting Power that disclaimed any Share in the Spoils. Now, the Gains, as well as the Desires of such a Partition, points out too plainly from whence it took its Rise: But if any Doubt remains, let any one consider the Answer given by the Court of *Vienna*, May 13. 1741. N. S. to a Memorial of Mr. *Robinson*'s of April 17. which is a downright Remonstrance against our advising an Accommodation, when it was too late—a Denial of having ever concerted or consented to any Convention for the Partition of *Prussia*; though acquainted with and apprised of it, she went no farther than to comply with the Desires of others, as she has Materials to prove.— And that the Convention sent from *Vienna* was formed in Conformity to the Representations of the Count *de Ostein* (who was the Queen's Minister at *London*.) Good God! what a Reproach is this to the martial Spirit which at first was brothed forth from this Side of the Water! What a plain tho' polite Declaration doth it contain of the Power to whose Account this new Partition-Treaty ought to be placed, since it was founded on the Representations of the Count *de Ostein*! And what Representations could he make, but such as were conformable to the Sentiments of the Court where he resided, and whose Assistance was to be obtained at any Price? Nor is this Remonstrance the only Authorities of this Fact; for many other Particulars of the like Nature occur in the Papers laid before the Parliament last Year—But a thorough Consideration of the whole Evidence would carry us too far from the pres. nt Point.

Amidst these bewitching Plays of military Operations and imaginary Divisions of the *Prussian Bear-Skin*, *France*, not once, as yet, thought of, steps between; and our late golden Projects evaporate to Air; from which unlucky Period, more Caution and less Presumption has appeared in those Councils

Councils which then undertook to canton out *Germany* at Will.

In particular, *Hanover*, that lately was so forward to have supported the Pragmatick Sanction, not only with the 4000 Men it was engaged to do, but with its whole Force, as likeways the *Danes* and *Hessians*, taken into the Pay of *England* against *Prussia*, was not now able to give the Queen of *Hungary* any Assistance, nay, nor to preserve itself without the Help of a Brace of Expedients, in which not a Spark of that Spirit, which blazed out so fiercely before, is visible, *viz.* A Neutrality with *France*, which had so extensive an Operation as to give Safety to our Merchant-Ships, or even a Man of War sailing through the Spanish Fleet, to say nothing of the said Fleet's sailing through the Straits in Sight of Admiral *Hoddock*, who had waited whole Years to intercept them. Secondly, To resign not only all Hopes of aggrandizing itself at the Expence of *Prussia*, but to empty its sacred Coffers, for the Satisfaction of some pecuniary Demands of a very extraordinary Nature, which makes it a very desireable Thing at present, to take the first favourable Opportunity to replenish them.

Under this Neutrality the Parliament met last Year, the whole Nation having already learned the Cause of that Treaty by the Effects; having likeways, by the same Clue, traced out the mysterious Origin of the *Hanover* Treaty, to which they made no Scruple to ascribe the Reduction of the exorbitant Power of the House of *Austria*, and almost to a Man convinced, that *Hanover* robbed us of the Benefit of being an Island, and was actually a Pledge for our good Behaviour on the Continent.

The Change that soon after happened in our Administration, naturally excited a Belief that our Measures would be changed likeways; and more especially from the universal Disatisfaction which had prevailed from the weak and wicked Conduct of our foreign Affairs.

The Nation expected a thorough Enquiry, an Enquiry into the Conduct of those who had destroyed the Balance of Power in *Europe*, who had exhausted and impoverished this Nation, and all for the sake of the Support and private Interest of a resolute Minister, who had given into every desperate Measure exacted from him on one Hand, that he might be able to command an Indemnity on the other.

But an Enquiry may take Place, and yet Justice be too lame to follow; and the Clamour arising from the Disappointment is to be stifled by the Noise of Arms and War, under the Pretence of recovering the Balance of *Europe*, which

we had ourselves given away, and to re-establish the House of *Austria*, which we had been first and principally instrumental to pull down.

In what is past, Nobody can dispute but our Folly is sufficiently visible; and in what now is, our Madness is as visible; since the Grand Alliance could scarce accomplish what *England* now ventures upon alone; or, if all is still but Matter of Amusement, what *England* alone must pay for.

With the Reduction of the House of *Austria*, the late Minister's favorite Scheme of foreign Politicks was worn out: His Successors, therefore, were under a Necessity to form a new, out of which they might find Means to render themselves of equal Importance to the Throne, and derive equal Advantages from the People.

If, therefore, the first demolished the House of *Austria*, it is their Busines to restore it to its ancient Splendor; and as he found his Account by frequent and large Remittances to *Denmark*, *Sweden*, *Hesse* and *Wolfenbuttle*, by the Way of *Hanover*, they hold it more adviseable to trade with *Hanover* direct; and therefore make no Bones of taking Sixteen Thousand Hanoverians into British Pay at once.

As this is a Point of vast Consequence to this Nation, and plainly shews the *Hanover* Rudder is still to steer *Great-Britain*, all possible Means and Arts will be used to disguise and conceal it; which makes it more necessary to enter into a full Disquisition of it.

The deplorable Situation the Queen of *Hungary* was reduced to, by past Measures, and the Concern this Nation felt for her Misfortunes, was at last alleviated, and we rejoiced in the happy Turn of her Affairs, and the Assurances we received that the *Dutch* would now join with us in assisting her, and likeways in the Hopes which were thrown out that *Prussia* would do the same.

In this Situation it happened, on the 23d of *March*, that, very late at Night, a Question was carried for Enquiry into the Conduct of the late Minister; immediately after which, according to the ancient Usage of Parliaments, to give liberally to the Crown upon a Prospect of Redress of Grievances, they came to a Resolution, declaring, that, 'as the late favourable Turn of Affairs affords reasonable Grounds to hope, that if the Queen of *Hungary* is timely and properly assisted by those Powers who are engaged by Treaties, and bound by Interest to support her, the Balance of Power may be again restored, and the Tranquility of Europe re-established; this House will therefore proceed with Unanimity, Vigour and Dis-

“ Dispatch, to support his Majesty in all such Measures as
“ shall be necessary to attain these great and desirable Ends,
“ &c.”

By which it plainly appears, that the Principle and Foundation of the Whole, was relative to those other Powers *engaged by Treaty and bound by Interest*, without whom nothing can be done, or ought to be attempted: It is not only a Declaration of our Readiness to assist and support that Cause, but Advice how to pursue it; that is to say, if *those Powers, who are equally engaged by Treaties, and bound by Interest*, would do the same: And upon that, and that only, the Resolution was, and could be founded; the Sense and Language speak no less, as well as the Hopes that were then infused into us, of *Prussia* and *Holland*’s joining in the same Cause; the Assurances of *Vigour and Dispatch in the Support of it*, therefore, can be understood as given only on these Conditions, and are actually restrained to that immediate Period of Time: For what Mortal then imagined, that we alone, without the Assistance of either of those two other great Powers, should engage and carry on, at our sole Expence, the Re-establishment of the House of *Austria*? The very Supposition would, at that Time, have been treated as an Extravagance that did not deserve an Answer.

But, to clear away the Rubbish as we go, the Parliament lost no Time to make good these Assurances, and enable the King to follow their Advice; for his Majesty having, by a Message to the House of Commons, on the 1st of *April*, grounded on, and repeating the most essential Words of the Resolution of the 23 of *March*, asked an extraordinary Supply to answer the Ends expressed in it; the House, as soon as the Forms would permit, agreed to grant his Majesty 500,000*l.* to enable him to concert proper Measures for such Alliances, or enter into such Engagements with other Powers, as his Majesty shall judge necessary for the Support of the House of *Austria*.

Accordingly this Resolution passed into a Law, and the whole Affair was, to all Intents and Purposes, closed.

The Vote of Credit, thus civilly introduced, being founded on the Advice of Parliament, and the Disposition of this Sum being understood and allowed to be, 300,000*l.* to the Queen of *Hungary*, and 200,000*l.* for the King of *Sardinia*.

But that this was the Whole that was designed at that Time, appears yet more fully by that very extraordinary Paragraph in his Majesty’s Speech at the End of the last Session, which acknowledges the said Sum to be granted for the far-
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ther Support and Defence of the Queen of Hungary, and to restore and secure the Balance of Power so particularly recommended to me by my Parliament; if it should become necessary for me to contract new Engagements, or to enter into farther Measures, I rely upon your Zeal and Perseverance in so just a Cause, to enable me to make them good; which plainly shews the new Measures and Expences, then to be entered into, were neither what the Parliament had advised or engaged to pay: The Whole was placed on the Hopes of their Zeal and Perseverance; the Thing was either so disagreeable to the Nation, or the Measure so wrong in itself, that, even at the latter End of that long Session, the Ministers dared not communicate it to, and take the Sense of Parliament on it; Time and future, Contingencies, it was hoped, would make it pass the easier.

And it must here be observed, that this Method of asking and spending the Money of the People is intirely new, and was never attempted, or perhaps thought of, before: To bespeak Aids and prepare the Nation to part with their Money, when the King parted with his Parliament, and not before, sufficiently alarmed them, as being an unusual Stretch of the Prerogative, and what afforded them no very pleasing Omens. But then the very Communication of this Design, in this Way, was, at the same Time, the strongest negative Proof that could be given, that the Parliament had not engaged to make good any such Expences as were then hinted at. Now, it was designed, some Time before the End of the Session, to take these Hanoverians into our Pay, Why was it not, therefore, communicated to the Parliament? The Reason is obvious, nor can the Fact be disputed: For his Majesty, in his Speech at the Close of the last Session, says, *I foresaw and pointed out to you, that it might be incumbent upon me to enter into farther Measures, &c.* which is to be understood of taking the said 16000 Hanoverians into our Pay. But, notwithstanding the plain and visible Motive of taking these 16000 Troops into our Pay, it must be expected that the Point will be endeavoured to be evaded and confounded with all the rest of the Affairs of Europe, and Successes will be boasted of, that Nobody sees or understands; and, as we have been already taught, that the March of these doughty Troops into Flanders, instead of Bohemia, or following Maillebois, prevented the Raising the Siege of Prague; so it will be again, with equal Modesty and Probability, asserted, that they have secured Flanders, preserved Holland, united it with England and Prussia; That they not only made the Neutrality for the Kingdom of Naples, but saved and secured the King of Sardinia: All which

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which is as certain, as that they will enable us to take and hold the *West-Indies*, and humble *Spain* into giving us a *real Security* for the Freedom of our Navigation there for the future.

If any Scribe or Orator can add any other Particular to this List of their Exploits, he has my free Leave, and I dare say it will be taken kindly of him——But first let him lend his Hand in helping to remove the trifling Objection which presents itself in the following Query, *viz.* Whether, when these Troops were first taken into *British Pay*, it was possible for them to be of any Service to *Great-Britain*? And, in order to do this, we must once more refresh the Memories of certain Persons, by again having Recourse to the famous *Treaty of Hanover*.

Be it recollected therefore, that when that Measure was first made publick, great Things were given out of the Advantages resulting to the Powers engaged in that Alliance, especially *England*, from the mighty Assurances to be given by *Hanover* and *Prussia* against the Emperor, which we were told they would not fail to do, though expressly contrary to the fundamental Laws of the Empire: Accordingly, to deceive the World into the vain Expectation that they would hazard their Dominions for the Sake of the common Cause, they engage themselves, and declare, by the 2d separate Article of that *Treaty*, that they will not furnish their Contingency, neither in Troops nor any other Succours, to the Empire, in case it declares War against *France*, which was then the only contracting Power of this *Treaty*; and this was held sufficient to take off the Objection made in *England*, that *Hanover* could neither assist us, nor act to any Purpose, an express Stipulation seeming to be such an Evidence to the contrary, as could not be contradicted. But, notwithstanding this explicit Engagement, those two Electoral Powers acted with such Caution, and knew so well the Consequence of acting against the Emperor and Empire, or even of their refusing their Contingencies to the Empire, that, the very same Day, they signed a third separate Article, by which they were left at Liberty to furnish their Quota's of Troops to the Empire against *France*, for Fear of certain disagreeable Consequences that would arise from their Refusal. And if they dare not refuse their Assistance, certainly they dare not have acted against it: The clandestine Manner therefore of making these separate Articles, as well as the Views with which they were made, plainly shews us we are never to trust to any Treaties however specious, or Assurances however positive, in those Points where the Interests of *Hanover* are to be jointly provided

vided for: For the true Motives of such Treaties and Assurances will always be couched in those Articles which are not to be made publick; and those that are made publick, will be no better than a political Blind, as hath been already demonstrated.

The Debates in Parliament, and the political Writings of those Times, so far, at last, and so effectually, exposed the Absurdity of expecting *German Troops* to act against the Emperor, that the only Pretence for keeping 12000 *Hessians* in our Pay, was reduced to this single Point, the rest being given up, that the States-General had an *equitable Demand* for them, because the 12000 Men we were engaged to furnish to them, in certain Cases, could hardly have been answered by the King, if he had raised no Troops but in England, because the Dutch are too well acquainted with the Accidents of the Sea, and the Difficulties and Delays which attend the transporting great Bodies of Troops. But even this Pretence was sufficiently ridiculed and exploded at that Time, as may be seen at large in a Piece called, *The Case of the Hessian Forces in the Pay of Great-Britain, &c.* which is to be found in the 6th Vol. of the *Craftsman*.

What we have next to consider, is the Conduct and Situation of *Hanover* since the Death of the *Emperor*. Its original Views, I mean, since its Connexion with *England*, and the Necessity it lay under of engaging in a Neutrality, when *Maillebois* was within Reach of its Frontiers, have been already explained; but it has not been mentioned, that, during the Time that all the Forces of *Hanover*, together with the *Hessians* and *Danes* in *British Pay*, were in Readiness to support and preserve the Balance of Power in the House of *Austria*, the Elector of *Hanover* first engaged his Vote, and afterwards gave it for the Elector of *Bavaria*'s being *Emperor*, who was chosen under these Circumstances, as claiming the greatest Part of the late *Emperor*'s hereditary Dominions, and they being in actual Possession of a great Part of *Austria* and of *Bohemia*: To which may be added, that he was no sooner mounted into the Imperial Thorne, but all the Laws and Constitution of the Empire concurred in supporting and carrying on his Pretensions to the Residue of the *Austrian* Dominions, in the strongest Manner imaginable: For the Evidence of which, we need only appeal to the Supplies he received from all Parts, and to that Vote, in particular, of the Electoral College, for granting him an Aid of as many *Roman Months*, as is usual when the Cause is common, and the whole Empire invaded. Let us be allowed to ask, therefore, Whether the Elector of *Hanover* once protested against that

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Vote? Whether he refused to comply with it? Whether, by any new Law, that Electorate was absolved from the Obligations of the Empire, and left at Liberty to act against the Emperor it so lately contributed to fix in the Imperial Throne? Whether the said Electorate hath since assisted the Queen of Hungary with the Four thousand Men the latter had a Right to claim by Treaty, though before it seemed determined to engage in her Quarrel with far greater Forces? Whether the Hessian Mercenaries were not continued in our Pay this Year, after it was avowed in Parliament that they could not act against the Emperor? And whether this was not desired only that they might not be hired by France against the Queen of Hungary? For if it can be still thought, that these Hanoverians and Hessian Troops dared to have acted in Germany, why did they not follow Maillebois, who was so nigh a Neighbour to them, and endeavour to distress and retard his March? Or, if the Neutrality of Hanover would not permit that, why did they not march into Bohemia to support the Queen of Hungary, in the Capacity of Allies to her, as the French supported the Emperor?

Now, if in Bar of all farther Queries, it should be urged, that as well the Neutrality with France, as the Laws of the Empire, put a Stop to all Proceedings that Way, we have no more to say, but that, what with the Laws of the Empire, and what with the Hanover Neutrality, 16,000 Hanoverians could march nowhere but into Flanders, for a Pretence, to receive so vast a Sum of Money from this Nation: And in this Point of Light we must see and consider every Step and Action in our foreign Affairs for this last Year; and, without this Clue, we may and shall be bewildered in tracing the many otherways contradictory Pretences and Actions that will be urged for justifying this Measure.

It is unnecessary to go any farther back now, in this Enquiry, than the Situation and Disposition of this Nation at the Meeting of the Parliament last Year, and of what has passed since upon the new Plan of foreign Affairs.

First, then, the Parliament met under the greatest Concern and Astonishment at the Hanover Neutrality, at the Spaniards reigning triumphant over the Mediterranean, at the Inactivity of our Fleet there; with the most sensible Concern for the deplorable Situation to which the House of Austria was reduced, and with the most sincere Dispositions to act vigorously and effectually in her Behalf. But Nobody was sanguine, I should say desperate, enough, to imagine that this mighty Enterprise could be accomplished by the Strength, or at the Expence of England alone: But, lest the Want of Confederates should

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damp our Zeal, and divert us from all Projects in her Favour; *Holland* and *Prussia* were again played off upon us, as not only inclined to come into Measures with us, but as waiting only to be convinced that we were really in earnest, and that they might depend on us, in order to join us upon our own Terms — That, therefore, no Proof of Sincerity might be wanting on our Side, 16,000 of our Troops were immediately to be sent over into *Flanders*; and it was declared, at the same Time, by the zealous Promoters of this Measure, that, in case the *Dutch* were not induced thereby, to co-operate with us for the Deliverance of the Queen of *Hungary*, we ought immediately to recall our Troops, and intrench ourselves within our own *Island*.

That, therefore, so great an Army was allowed last Year, was in order to dispatch these 16,000 Men on this important Errand; and that these 16,000 Men were accordingly dispatched, was in order to retrieve our Credit with the *Dutch*, without whom we were to attempt nothing, but, from hence-forward, make it our only Care to provide for our own Security.

Whoever compares the Situation of Affairs at that Time, with the dear-bought Experience of the past, must be convinced, and ought to acknowledge, that, except when the *Dutch* are in Danger, it can never be the Interest of this Nation to embark in the Troubles of the Continent.

Now, the rapid Success with which the House of *Austria* had been over-run, at that Time, by the victorious Arms of *France*, *Bavaria*, *Prussia* and *Saxony* (while its only Ally *Hanover* was, at the same Time, severed from it by a Neutrality) gave just Apprehensions, consistent with former Experience, to the *Dutch*, that their Barrier was in Danger; especially as *France* had so lately purchased *Lorrain*, under Pretence of Indemnification for the Charge it had been at in the War against the Emperor on account of *Stanislaus*; though it had, all the While, made the most solemn Declarations that it would take nor hold any Thing for itself. As therefore Reimbursement and Indemnification made as effectual Acquisitions as any other Pretence whatever, as *France* seemed now to have an Opportunity to bring in a larger Bill of Charges than ever, as she was strong enough to enforce the Payment without any Deduction or Abatement whatever, and as the *Austrian Netherlands* lay most opportunely to answer her Demands, the States had then Reason to be on their Guard; and they accordingly appeared so sensible of this Danger, that they added to their Forces 30,000 Men: This Alarm called upon *England* to enter into as vigorous Measures, at least, for the Support of them and the Queen

of *Hungary*, as had been followed while the former Plan was in Force for reducing the House of *Austria*; and it was with this View the 16,000 *English* Troops were to be sent over.

Till this Alarm was given, 'till this Danger appeared, Subsidies to our remoter Allies could only be expected from us, and even those ought to be proportioned to our own Necessities as well as theirs.

We are no longer in such flourishing Circumstances, as when we doled about our Subsidies to every Prince almost that pleaded Inability to pay even for his own Preservation; and yet, even then, though colleagued with the Majority of the Powers of *Europe*, some of which carried on their Shares of the War at their own Charge, though Success added an annual Lustre both to our Politicks and Arms, we found ourselves, at last, sinking under the Burden of our own Victories, and, to this Hour, we have Reason to lament the Trophies so dearly purchased.

If, therefore, we gained nothing else, we might have gained at little more Discretion, in Exchange for so many Legions lost, and so many Millions squandered, and laid it down as an invariable Maxim, never to enter into a Land War, never, but when the *Dutch* Barrier was in Danger, or, at least, in Conjunction with that wise and cautious People: A People that consider the Commotions of their Neighbours as so many Opportunities for them to enlarge their Trade, and increase their Wealth, as they have uniformly done, from the Treaty of *Utrecht* 'till now.

But to return to our immediate Point: All the Designs and Prospects of last Year were placed on assisting and being assisted by the *Dutch*: If they stood out, we knew very well there would be no real Necessity for our meddling at all, and that it would prove almost impossible to raise the necessary Sums in case we did: For, as to *Hungary* and *Sardinia*, they had no Money; and as to *Hanover*, it would part with none: And if we grew weary of paying annually 5,000,000*l.* in Exchange for annual Victories, before we were yet exhausted, there was little Reason to think we should now be either willing or able to furnish seven or eight Millions to support what we had no Concern in, and from which we had no Prospect of Returns, either in Profit or Honour.

It so happened, while these Measures were pursued, as we imagined, on those Principles, that the Affairs of the Queen of *Hungary* took a happy and unexpected Turn; she became not only successful in her own Enterprises, but found Means to disengage *Prussia* and *Saxony* from *France*: Nay, even *France* herself became perplexed and entangled to such a Degree, as to find herself obliged to offer Terms to the Queen of *Hun-*

Hungary, for the saving both her Forces and her Honour : From that Moment, therefore, the Interest, and of Course the Policy of the *Dutch* was to change ; the Dread of *France*, and its being to be paid at the Expence of their Barrier, was lost ; their ancient and wise Maxims for the Gain of Wealth, and the Preservation of their own Quiet, were revived in their full Force ; one of which was, never to engage in any War but for the Sake of Trade, and the immediate Concerns of their own Country : The consuming Wars of other Nations, as before observed, made them not only richer, but more powerful, at the same Time that they exhausted and impoverished the Parties concerned in them.

There are, indeed, many remarkable Passages in *De Wit* on the true Interest and political Maxims of the Republick of *Holland*, which are so adapted to their present Situation and Conduct, and still so exactly observed, that one cannot help thinking him to be at the Head of the Republick still.

In a Word, to be safe seems to be their first Concern, and to be rich their second ; and though alarmed, when convinced there is no real Danger, they return to their grand Pursuit of Wealth as before : Thus, for the *French* to exhaust their Strength on one Hand, without encroaching upon them, and for us to neglect our Commerce on the other, in order to build Castles in the Air, puts them in Possession of all they have to ask of Heaven : And such being apparently their Case at present, nothing but downright Phrenzy could have induced them to drop the Substance, in order to catch at the Shadow.

The Terms which were offered by *France* to the Queen of *Hungary*, they then plainly perceived, as well as we do now, with no very material Alteration, would, sooner or later, be the Terms of Accommodation between them ; perhaps not more than might then have been obtained, had those Terms been admitted for the Foundation of a Treaty by our Ministers : They are likeways convinced, as well as we, of the Impracticability of raising this Phantom of the House of *Austria* to be again capable of balancing the Power of the House of *Bourbon* : They know, as well as we, what Interest and what Motives have destroyed it ; and as they know it was the Interest of this Nation only to have preserved it ; and even now, if there was a Possibility of doing it, to raise it to its former Power and Splendor ; so likeways they know too well, that it is against the Interest of every Prince in *Germany*, and even of the King of *Sardinia* himself, that such an Event should take Place : They moreover know, that the Imperial Power, so necessary for that Purpose, is irrecoverably lost ; that the united Voices that raised

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this present Emperor to the Throne are united in Interest, that neither he nor his Successors shall become so formidable as his Predecessors were: That *Prussia*, *Saxony*, and every Prince of the Empire but one, are satisfied with the Terms offered by *France*, and that even he, perhaps, blusters only to save Appearances, or in Resentment of a certain Indignity lately put upon him by *France*; or till a favourable Opportunity offers of making some farther Acquisition to the Dominion he is so partial to, and so fond of.

Having thus mentioned the Terms offered by *France* to the Queen of *Hungary*, it is necessary to consider what has or may have been the Conduct of our Ministers on that Head. In the first Place then it is visible, that, if they have not made it a Point with that Princess, to reject the Offers of *France*, which there is some Reason to suspect, by going such Lengths in pretending to serve her, and appearing so immoderately zealous in her Cause, they have led her to stake her All, in a Manner, on our Friendship and Support, and thereby involved this Nation, already but too much incumbred, in Engagements we can hardly quit with Honour, and Expences that will beggar us to support. As it was the highest Presumption in us to undertake such mighty Things, without the Concurrence of the *Dutch*, so it was to the last Degree impolitick, to say no worse, not to advise her to accept the Offers of *France*, when it appeared that the *States* had determined to leave her wholly upon us— Our Ministers had then a fair Opportunity to get rid of what they could never accomplish, and save their Country from the Reproach of being the Wind-Mill-Fighter of *Europe*. Instead of which, by tenaciously adhering notwithstanding, they have, in a Manner, put themselves into the Power of the Queen of *Hungary*, who will no longer humbly beseech the Compassion and Succour of the People of *England*, but affect to command it, by threatening from Time to Time to make up with *France*, on the least Demur, and leave us to shift for ourselves. So that, in consequence of such rash and precipitate, or corrupt and treacherous Measures, the Substance of this Nation must be spread all over *Germany*, and its Forces wasted, without Consideration of either Times or Season, or the necessary Preparation for their Safety or Subsistence: And yet, in Spite of all, as *England* can never supply Wealth or Power enough to raise her to that Height we promised, nor even to gain her an Equivalent for *Silesia*, she must at last submit to such Terms of Peace as *France* offers, and we shall all have Reason to wish she had accepted now. For, whenever that Time comes, Submission must be our Lot as well as her's, and we shall find we have

have parted with such infinite Sums only to purchase Infamy and Ruin.

With every other true *Englishman* I sincerely wish my Apprehensions of the Consequences of that fatal Step may never prove true ; but the Situation of *Europe* at present administers no Hopes of the contrary. It will, it must, be asked, both now and hereafter, what could induce us to engage our All in this desperate Undertaking ? The Intrigues of the Cabinet, the Contention for domestick Power, and the Pay of the *Hanoverian* Troops, occur by Way of Reply : But then it is such a Reply as will never be candidly made by one Side, nor be allowed, if it was, by the other. No, we are rather to expect Disguises and Palliations of all Sorts ; but then they will be the thinnest that were ever yet brought into Use. When the two great Points come to be canvassed, *viz.* why we, in the present terrible Situation of our Affairs, plunged ourselves ~~alone~~ into an Undertaking so vast in its own Nature, and so pernicious in its Consequences ; and whether we could have acted more to the Prejudice of our own Country, than by influencing the Queen of *Hungary*, no Matter by what Means, to reject the Offers of *France* : I say, when these two capital Points come to be canvassed, all imaginable Arts will be used to put us on a different Scent ; in particular, we shall be called upon to take Notice of the Wonders performed by the Troops of *Hanover*, and amused with Stories of a great Army's being particularly necessary to be assembled in *Flanders*, at the Requisition of the King of *Sardinia*, at the Requisition of the Queen of *Hungary* ; and that such was her distressed Case, that no other Troops could be gotten, for Love or Money, but *Hanoverians* : That the Noise of these mighty Preparations drew off the *French* Forces from *Dauphiny* ; that they prevented more Forces being sent into *Germany* ; and that it was shewing a seasonable Spirit and Vigour in Defence of our Allies ; but, observe, not a Word will be said of the *Dutch*, though the Foundation upon which alone the *British* Troops were sent Abroad ; nor a Word of those other Powers, who are engaged by Treaty, and bound by Interest, to support the Queen of *Hungary*, as well as we.

But to bestow a few Words upon what is uttered in Defence of this memorable and mighty Transaction. Did the King of *Sardinia*, from his own mere Motion, desire this Diversion in *Flanders*, rather than anywhere else ? Were not the Troops in *Dauphiny* removed from thence long before the Appearance of this warlike Parade there ? Whither did those very Troops march ? Had the *Hanoverians* and others marched directly to

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Menz, could it have been less a Diversion for the *French Forces*? Does it not appear visibly to have been the Interest of the Queen of *Hungary*, that they should have marched thither at first? And, if it is so much insisted upon now, even so late in the Year, would it not then have been a greater Assistance to her, and a Distress to the *French*? Was it not solicited and desired they should march thither before? Or, at least, was it not very well known here, as the Sense of that Court, that they wished it? If, therefore, these Wishes of theirs could not be obtained, is it at all surprising that they should have so much Complaisance, as to desire our Court to send them to that Place only where they found they had any Inclination to send them? Were the *Dutch* consulted in this? Was it by their Advice and Approbation? Why don't they say a Word about them in this Affair? Did not his Majesty, in his Speech last Session, tell the Parliament, 'That the present favourable Disposition of the *States-General*, and of other great Powers is, under *God*, chiefly owing to the generous Assistance afforded by this Nation to its ancient and natural Allies?' May we not ask, therefore, what are become of all those Allies now? That the March of 16000 *Hanoverians* into *Flanders*, so late as *October*, to open a Campaign, should prove so powerful a Diversion to the *French Forces* in all Parts at once, may be uttered gravely out of the Mouth of a Statesman, but it will be treated with Ridicule by all the rest of the World.

But one Thing shall be considered and granted, for the Argument Sake only, upon their strongest State of the Question, *viz.* That the assembling of this great Body of Forces in *Flanders* rendered the *French* unable to send any Reinforcement to any other Parts. But if so, the *Hanoverians* were intirely unnecessary, excepting perhaps the 4000 Men they were obliged to furnish to the Queen of *Hungary*; since the rest of the 16000 might very well have been spared from hence, without any Danger arising to us from their Absence, since as many would still have been left at Home as were ever employed for our own Defence, during the most dangerous Part of the late War with *France*; and certainly our Troops would have arrived there long before the *Hanoverians*. But then, perhaps, it might have been too soon for the winding up the Farce of the Year; and certainly would have robbed some People of the Pretence for paying the *Hanover Subsidy* at all.

When the vigorous Resolution was taken, for sending over 16,000 Men into *Flanders*, a more considerable Embassy, than usual of late Years, was sent to *Holland*, and it was not long before we were sensible of the Disposition of the *States*, by the Memorials that were presented, which appear to be *that*

ther addressed to the Opinion of the *Dutch* People, than what was thought to be consistent with that of the *States*, who soon shewed us what was to be expected from them ; and though there appeared no Hopes of drawing them into the Views of the Court of *Great-Britain* in respect of *Flanders*, yet the *British* Ministers, even the *last*, were very assiduous and importunate to obtain their High Mightinesses Guaranty for the Electorate of *Hanover*.

Uncommon and extraordinary as this was, that the said *British* Ministers should be so engaged, yet it would be much more so, to find it was fundamentally the principal Object of Negotiation : Nor must we forget those romantick Schemes, about the same Time given out, of inclosing *Maillebois* between the *Hanoverian* Forces, and the 16,000 *English* that were to be sent over from hence, and their designed March at first towards that Electorate ; neither must it be forgotten, that, upon certain Rumours being spread abroad, that the Neutrality of *Hanover* ceased, that the *French* Minister declared, by Order of his Master, in a Memorial to the *States-General*, that it still subsisted, and that his Master had *fresh Proofs* of it in his Hands ; and it is certain the *Hanoverians* did not march after *Maillebois*. Let us add here, still by Way of Query, why these warm Solicitations were carried on, not only at the *Hague*, but at every Court of *Europe*, where there were any Hopes to get a defensive Alliance, and a Guaranty for *Hanover* ? Why such extraordinary Joy appears upon the late obtaining a Brace of Alliances, and particularly that of *Prussia*, which is so prudently boasted to be for the Protection and Guaranty of *Hanover* ? Does it not point out, and plainly tell us, that *Hanover* could not, consistent with its own Safety and Engagements, act either against the Neutrality with *France*, or against the Laws of the Empire ? But the Dangers that might ensue to it are too obvious to leave a Doubt of that fundamental and first Principle, its own Preservation, in all Considerations whatsoever. Do not these Rejoicings therefore, as well as the urging that the *Hanover* Troops may now act, since the Guaranty of *Prussia* hath been obtained, plainly confess that they could not do it before ? That its Engagements to the contrary are still the same, and that therefore the Sword of *Prussia* is absolutely necessary for its Protection ? And how far that may be relied on, in case *France* should be victorious, his Actions in *Silesia* very sufficiently demonstrate.

The late Orders said to be sent for the March both of the *British* and *Hanover* Troops to *Mentz*, are urged to palliate the

Inactivity and Uselessness of them last Year, and to be a Pre-
tence for paying them this: But let us not forget, while we
are considering this extraordinary Step, the mighty and war-
like Preparations of last Summer, and how long the Nation
was made to believe that his Majesty would, even so late in
October, put himself at the Head of his united Forces: These
Appearances portended Actions that seemed then to justify
the taking of 16,000 *Hanoverians* into our Pay, because our
own Forces were too small for a royal Command without
them; and, that his Majesty might appear equally the Sov-
ereign of both those People, and that they might equally share
in the Glory of such a Command, it was as absolutely ne-
cessary to have 16,000 *Hanoverians*, as 16,000 *English*.

But, unluckily, it is impossible ever to think of the Orders
for this extraordinary March, without its eternally occurring
to one's Thoughts, why they did not (if designed for any real
Use) march thither at first, since the Assistance by it, to the
Queen of *Hungary*, must have been greater, and of Course the
Diversion to *France* likewise. The undertaking of it now,
therefore, is extremely surprising, when the Difficulty of per-
forming it is considered, as well as the Utility to arise from
it; even in Summer great Preparations are necessary for such
an Enterprise; nor could the Undertaking, even then, be ju-
stified, unless such Preparations had first been made. In Win-
ter then, in a Country already harrassed with the March both
of Friends and Enemies, where all Foreigners are considered
as Foes; where no one Magazine is formed, and Necessaries
are even scarcer than Money, and where the Roads are almost
impassable, How is it to be conceived, that such a March is
practicable to such unhardned Troops as ours, or, at least,
without the Loss of great Numbers, who will die of Fatigue
alone, even if supplied with Provisions, and unopposed by any
Enemy?

To all this let us add the present Impossibility of carrying
thither our Artillery, the Difficulties of sending Recruits, the
Probability of having every Convoy cut off that should be
sent to their Relief, and the certain Perdition that must at-
tend every small Party that Rapine and Hunger may detach
from the Army to seek their Fortune among those Peasants,
who are infamous for shewing no Mercy.

Then, as to the Utility, (I do not mean at home, but a-
broad) when that is considered, the Question will be, against
whom, and when they can act? It must be against the *Emperor*,
the *Empire*, or *France*: And can the *Hessians*, who were taken
into our Pay last Year, when it was known and avowed that
they

they could not serve against the *Emperor*, and who were retained to prevent their going into the Part of *France*, can these *Hessians*, I say, act against the *Emperor* now, or against the *Hessians*, their Fellow Subjects, in the Imperial Service? Can the *Hanoverians* act without Breach of the Imperial Laws, or of the Neutrality with *France*? No, certainly; for though, upon Assurance of Success, it might possibly be ventured, yet, while it remains a Doubt, the Consequence of the Ban of the Empire, and the Regiment of *France*, (which may be hereafter felt, even in *Hanover* itself) will and must be well considered, before Hostilities are committed, or the Blow struck.

As, therefore, it is as impossible now, as last Year, for the *Hessians* to act against the *Emperor*; as *Hanover* lies under the very same Difficulty, and, however guarded and fenced round by Guarantees, may be a grievous Sufferer by so hazardous an Experiment, it is scarce to be credited, that it will run the Risque, especially under all the additional Difficulties above specified.

Lured by an insatiable Thirst of Gain in whatever Shape, in Love with military Spectacles, and to make a Soldier-like Figure in the Field, *Hanover* may proceed as far as a March, or a Counter-March—more would be too much—And one Breach of the present Neutrality might render a Neutrality impossible for the Time to come.

On these Principles, how little Penetration would have served to foresee, that nothing could be done in *Flanders*, that nothing can be done elsewhere.

In Defect, therefore, of real Services, imaginary ones must be pretended, (for it is become necessary that *Great Britain* should be duped, that *Hanover* may be enriched) and of these no other Power can pretend to the least Share of the Glory.

It is true, we very courteously invited them to participate, but it was, perhaps, because we foresaw we should be refused: And that this Refusal was foreseen is obvious, by our having been at the Expence of sending over a very splendid and expensive Train of Artillery, which, in Times of real Action, we never did, that Article having always been supplied by the *Dutch*.

But however signal the Successes of this *Flemish Campaign* have proved, they have not altogether answered the first Givings-out concerning it. The great Magazines of Powder, and all the other Preparations of War amassed at *Ghent*, we were told portended Destruction to *Paris* itself; Talkers were found, who undertook to shew it was feasible. The demolishing of *Dunkirk* was however founded loudest, in order

to amuse, to animate, and prepossess this Nation into a tolerable Opinion of the Measures then pursued, but which have only served as a Pretence for making it impregnable again; nay, it is permitted to be a Port, and as such is reckoned in our Custom-house, under the present Administration, as well as the last: To complete the Farce, we were to leave the whole Frontiers behind us, and to enter into the Heart of *France*, subsist there, and come back as we could: Beside all this, there was yet another Design not altogether so extravagant, which was the March of our Troops into *Germany*, in order to have met the *Hanoverians* there, rather than first to bring them into *Flanders*, and then to march them there at this Time of the Year: But, alas! the first courtly Step, of taking them into our Pay, was upon other Considerations: In *Flanders* they might make a Shew, if not venture, as the hired Troops of *England*, to be guilty of the Breach of the *Hanover* Neutrali-ty, or the Laws of the Empire; but had they dared to act in *Germany* then, or dare to do it now, Success will justify the Action, or make it criminal. But whatever our Schemes were, *France* laughed, *Maillebois* marched to *Bohemia*, and the rest of *Europe* ridiculed every Step we took, as well foreseeing, that this mighty Expence could not so much as purchase us a single Town. Upon the Whole, what are we to expect will be the Issue of these courtly Politicks? *France* is neither exhausted, nor to be bullied into any Submissions, by all we have done or can do; and the Interest of the Ministers and *Hanover* are, at present, rendered incompatible. It is the Interest of the Ministers that these Troops should do something abroad, to excuse them for so inflaming the publick Charge at home: It is the Interest of *Hanover* and *Hesse* to do nothing to deserve that Pay, which may bring Ruin upon themselves. But if any other Interest should, for once, prevail, *Hanover* may be caught, and at last be a Sufferer at a Time it least expected it: But whatever is the Interest of our Ministers, as the Interest of *England* and *Hanover*, at present, perfectly coincide in this Point, barring the trifling pecuniary Considerations, 'tis the Duty of true *Englishmen*, as well as loyal Subjects, who sincerely wish well to the present royal Family, to be against the taking these 16000 *Hanoverians* into our Pay.

In vain are those idle Expectations, which are founded on the Exhausting and Impoverishment of *France*. Has she yet raised the huge Sums she raised during the late War? Has she employed the third Part of the Forces she did then? Or lost any Number of Men, in Comparison of what she did then?

then? Has not the Price of her Actions rose very considerably since the Time of their sending a Fleet to the *West-Indies*? Some Difficulties, in respect of borrowing new Sums, the Foundation and Forms of their Government must create. But how little do they weigh, when it is considered, that their *Actions* still keep up as high as ever? Besides, if they have their Difficulties, have not we the like? And if the high Price of Stocks is made use of as a Palliative on our Side, why are they not intitled to the same Privilege? According to my Conceptions, the Disadvantages that attend Credit in an arbitrary Government like theirs, renders the Conclusion more advantageous to them than us. In few Words, they neither raise the Men nor the Money, nor any other Way exert their Strength or Vigour, as they did in the late War; whilst we exceed it by Millions, notwithstanding the Want of Money, and the universal Decay of our Manufactures.

The Poverty of *Spain*, it was expected and much insisted on, would reduce it to a Compliance to the *Hanover* Alliance: But, though she has been continually exhausting herself ever since, and now labours under the Difficulty of an open War with us, which, though not successful enough to *take and hold*, must nevertheless shorten her Remittances from the *West-Indies*, she is still able, not only to make Head against us, but to maintain and support two great Armies for the Conquest of Part of *Italy*.

What may we not then expect from *France*, which so long supported itself against the victorious grand Alliance, in the late War, and fear for ourselves, when we alone, without the *Dutch* and the rest of that mighty Confederacy, are to reduce that haughty Power, and re-establish the House of *Austria* in its ancient Glory, at the sole Expence of *Great-Britain*?

Great-Britain hath been hitherto strong and vigorous enough to bear up *Hanover* on its Shoulders; and, though wasted and wearied out with the continued Fatigue, she is still goaded on, as if already sold to *Vassallage*, and, by Compulsion, obliged to persist in the ungrateful Drudgery, without Hope of, or a Title to Redemption.

Thus the very Condition of sending over 16000 of our Troops, *viz.* to act in Conjunction with the *Dutch*, or otherwise to be countermanded immediately, is to be now most artificially and complaisantly forgot; and we are to be told, that, because these were too few for Action, and the *Hessians* would not act at all, it was necessary to add 16000 *Hanoverians*, that the Queen of *Hungary* might be effectually served, and the States be convinced that we were fool-hardy and prodigal enough to *draw on* *war* *in* *Europe* alone. But

But sure we have too much good Sense to be so imposed upon, too much Spirit not to resent the very Attempt, and too much Discretion to beggar ourselves for the Sake of an Interest that has been a Snare and a Curse to us from the Beginning.

I do not know any Thing more impolitick, nay, more dangerous, than for a Suspicion to prevail, that we are governed by Tricks and Frauds to answer bad Purposes, instead of noble and generous Measures, worthy of a just King, and a great People.

With what Concern therefore must we look upon that Fountain of Truth, which told us, at the End of the last Session, of the then favourable Disposition of the *States-General*, if it shall appear, that, long before, it was designed, and we are now actually to pay for 16000 *Hanover* Troops? Or what Opinion must we hold of our present most excellent Ministers, when it is made manifest, that either they expected nothing from the *Dutch* at that Time, or that the *Hanover* Troops were taken into our Pay for private Considerations only?

Either Way, be it again, and for ever remembred, that it was last Session declared, That without the *Dutch* we neither could, would, nor ought to do any Thing. Let it likeways be remembred, how large a Body of useles Troops were continued at Home, how strongly it was urged, upon taking the 4000 additional Men into our Pay from *Ireland*, over and above the great Army which was at first voted on Account of the sending these 16000 Men Abroad, that this Augmentation was not made for our Defence at Home, for that was ridiculous, but because it would be necessary to send yet more Forces Abroad, when we shold begin to act; the Smalness of the Number first sent, and the Absurdity of acting without the *Dutch*, being likeways strongly insinuated, as well as the Expence and Time requisite for the sending a proper Reinforcement of our own Troops; therefore, that this Reinforcement was not sent, if we had any Intentions to draw the Sword at all, no other Answer can be sincerely given, but that we should thereby have lost the happy Opportunity of paying 16000 *Hanoverians*. But how cruel, how provoking, how beyond all Forgiveness, doth this Extravagance appear? When it is considered, that, by way of Encouragement for us to embark in the Troubles of *Europe*, which we had no immediate Concern in, it was given out, that now was the Time, the only proper Time, because *France* was already exhausted, consequently must be utterly unable to make any Attempt upon *Great-Britain*, and that nevertheless, while our own Towns and Villages were eaten up by red Locusts, we should make such

such an unmerciful Addition to the publick Grievances, as to hire 16000 Mercenaries, though convinced they would prove as little serviceable Abroad, as our own Janizaries at Home. Let me be allowed to add, that when one recollects what great Numbers of national Troops were employed during the last general War in *Flanders, Spain and Portugal*, and the few that were thought and found sufficient for our own Defence, it is impossible not to be extremely surprized, to find there are as many effective Men of our own now in Pay as then ; that of these but 16,359 Men are in *Flanders*, and that the Guards and Garrisons for this Island this Year are to be 23,610 Land-Forces, and 11,550 Marines, the greatest Part of which will be always in Readiness to march.

Now, for what End is this formidable Corps to be kept up in *Great-Britain* ? Not for fear of ourselves ; that Pretence hath already been given up ; and *France*, as before hinted, we have likeways been told, is in no Condition of molesting us ; being so disabled by her Expences, Losses, &c. as to be glad of a Peace upon any Terms ; and as to *Spain*, her whole Fleet is already locked up in *Toulon*, and her Forces endeavouring to make Conquests in *Italy* : With the Advantage, therefore, of such a superior naval Force to cover our Coasts, would not 10,000 Men be sufficient to answer the End of Guards and Garrisons ? And if we *must* be saddled with these 16000 *Hanoverians*, ought we not to disband as many, at least, of our own *Countrymen*, that we may be able to give their Bread to Strangers ; for we begin to be already sensible that the Treasures of *Great-Britain* have a Bottom ; and that, if we proceed in this Manner for a Year or two longer, that Bottom will be found ?

I cannot, however, dismiss these notable Friends of ours, without a Paragraph or two relating to the Time when they are to enter into Pay ; which, as it is given out, is fixed for some Day in *March* last ; but with what Reason will best appear from the following Observations, *viz.*

It was not 'till the 23d of *March* that the Parliament-Address took any Notice of the King's Engagements ; it was not till *July 15*, that his Majesty signified that he *foresaw* the Forces already provided for would not be sufficient : And when his Majesty opened the present Session, he doth not extend his Royal *Fore sight* beyond the Close of the last — *At the Close of the last Session, I foresaw, I pointed out, &c.* Now, a Thing cannot be foreseen that hath actually taken Place, and therefore we will not, nay, we cannot suppose, that a *Fore sight* and a *Retrospect* will be made to signify the same Thing.

Besides,

Besides, though it does not appear when the Refusal of the Dutch to co-operate was foreseen, most certain it is, that our own Troops did not arrive in *Flanders* till *August*, nor those of *Hanover* till *October*. Now, in a Convention with *Hanover* in 1702. for taking certain Troops of that Electorate into *British* Pay, which was signed *June 21*, the first Article declares, that Part of the said Troops were already arrived on the lower *Rhine*, where it was stipulated they should serve; and, by the Sequel, we learn, that their Pay was to commence *June 1*, but three Weeks before the Treaty was signed, and perhaps not a Day before the Part above mentioned were at their Posts.

With what Face therefore can it be urged in the present Instance, that Troops hired of the same Power, for the Service of *Germany*, not *Great-Britain*, should be paid before the first of that Month in which they began to obey what will be called *British* Orders?

But that they should be paid only from that Day is not all: The *British* Nation presume to hope and expect, that either the 4000 Men which *Hanover* was to furnish the Queen of *Hungary* with, will be deducted from the 16000, or that, at least, we shall only pay the Difference between their own Pay, and that which is necessary for their Service Abroad, as we often do the Difference between the *English* and *Irish* Pay, all being Subjects of the same Prince: For no Man thinks so meanly of his Majesty, as to imagine he designs, whatever his Ministers may do, to save and pocket what would be their own Pay at Home, as well as the entire Expence of the 4000 Men due from *Hanover* to the Queen of *Hungary*: On the contrary, so much more nobly do we conceive of his Majesty's fatherly Compassion of his People, that we depend on his placing, even to his own Accomp^t, the Difference of the Pay, as disdaining to be outdone in Generosity by a Daughter of *James II*. I mean her late most excellent Majesty Queen *Anne*, whose Memory will ever be dear to these Kingdoms, till Time shall be no more, in that she freely contributed a full Sixth of her Revenue to the Relief of her People, and the Support of the War.

Hitherto, indeed, her royal Example hath only been praised, without being imitated, the Overflowings of the present prodigal civil List having been diverted another Way; and the House of *Austria* reduced at the Expence of the People only: But, while we were rich, we did not stand in Need of the Charity of the Crown, and, I presume, it was only with-

held till Necessity should render it doubly welcome. And whether the Savings out of it would not answer these Extra-Expences of *Hanoverian* Mercenaries, let the late Report of the *Secret Committee* determine.

Perhaps the Perusal of the few foregoing Sheets may reduce the Advocates for the present Measures to the Necessity of a general Confession, that it is true we have acted contrary to our Interest, in engaging in a Land-War without the *Dutch*; and that the Affair of the *Hanover* Troops we can neither defend nor approve of; but that, nevertheless, now we are in, we must go on, or else give up the Queen of *Hungary*; and that, when the War is over, it will be proper to enquire into the Advisers of these Measures, and to punish the Authors, if they appear to deserve it.

This, or something to the like Effect, they may be either led or drove to confess and plead; but surely, neither the Nation nor the Parliament can be so influenced by it, as to persist in Measures acknowledged to be destructive to the Interest, perhaps to the very Being of their Country, on the distant Prospect of a future Enquiry, which the like Influence may then over-rule, or of future Punishment, which, by a recent Example, we are taught already to despair of.

It is, on the contrary, our Duty to put a Stop to such fatal Measures in the first Instance, and compel our present Undertakers to act according to their original Plan, or not at all.

When we have once adopted, or proceeded upon a bad Scheme, it will be said we have authorized it; that it ceases to be the Minister's, and becomes our own; and, in this Presumption, Supplies will become Debts, which will be exacted, not solicited, and both the Queen of *Hungary* abroad, and our own Bashaws at home, will measure the publick Wants by their own Will and Pleasure.

Agreeable then to the Dictates of right Reason and sound Policy, and the Duty we owe to our Parent-Country, let us declare and resolve, that, as the *Dutch* have left us to be crushed underneath the Burden, while they run away with every Advantage, the keeping of 16000 Men abroad is burdensome and unnecessary, and can serve only to colour our paying for 16000 as burdensome and unnecessary *Hanoverians*. And that, as we certainly ought greatly and generously to support this Prince as an Ally, but not engage in her Quarrel as a Principal, it would be more for her Advantage and ours, to give her an additional Subsidy of 540,000*l.* which is the Pay of the 16000 *English* now in *Flanders*; since there-

by

by she would be enabled to keep up an Army of double the Number we now pretend to compliment her with, and we should be rid of all farther Claims with respect to these obnoxious *Hanoverians*.

Supposing which to be done, we may safely disband 16,000 of our own Forces, since the Residue will amount to 46,887 effective Men, a Number not only sufficient for all good Purposes, but by two Thirds too many, when *France* is too much exhausted to think of invading us, and the *States* most certainly refuse to co-operate with us.

Upon the whole, the present deplorable and melancholly Situation of *Europe*, the Causes to which it was owing, the constant and uniform Conduct and Considerations of all our Ministers in our foreign Affairs, ever since 1714. and the present Contest, whether we shall sacrifice the true Interest of this Nation, and all its remaining Substance, to the little low Interest of *Hanover*, for ministerial Views conspire to make the Determination of this Question of the utmost Importance: For the Interests of this Island must, for this once, prevail, or we must submit to the Ignominy of becoming only a Money-Province to that Electorate, and rush upon the Danger of being sundered into two more opposite and irreconcileable Parties than ever yet disturbed the publick Peace, *viz.* *Englishmen*, and *Hanoverians*.

F I N I S.

